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Abstract of
VF.RY LARGE CRUDE CARRIERS (VLCCs)
and RULES OF THE ROAD

FOR THR PREVENTION OF COLLISIONS

A discussion of tanker ship development from the loIorld \\Ta.r II
T-2 to the million ton "Delta Ship" concept and an analysis of
present and proposed Rules of the Road as they apply to VLCCs.
The advantages of size, deaign characteristics, crew size and
automation, propulsion systems and shiphandling characteristics "
are discussed in general comparitive terms. Projections show
tremendous increase not only in the size of tank ships, but
also in the size of the

wo~ldls

tanker fleet - approaching

5,000 vessels in the next ten years or so. The increasing size
"-

of crude oil carriers and their .mmense pollution potential
has prompted special accomodation in the Rules of the Road in
order to reduce the risk of collision. The 1912 IMCO revision.
to the Rules of the Road incorporated VLCC definition and accorded these vessels privilege in specific tenms. Aspects of
these new Rllle3 are discussed and same of the weaknesses are

pointed out.
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PREFACE

About five years ago while my ship was undergoing repairs
in a Japanese shipyard, I had the opportunity to follow final
phases of construction of the 213,,000 dwt tanker, "Energy Evolutionll • Since then, as tanker sizes have progressively increased ..
I · have taken a sailor's intereBt in observing their growth and

operational sophistications. I was amazed when I was told that
IlEnergy Fvo.Lutdon'' was designed to operate with a crew of just 35.
By comparison, my ship, a Horld War II destroyer, had a crew of

275. It was intrieuing to me how so few men could operate such
a large ship - and do so Bafely. But so far my skeptici am has
had no grounds. The sensation of size that one eats aboard one
. of these huge ships simply cannot be described, and the only one
Irve been on is smallish compared to the 500,000 tonners being

built now.
Related to sizo, is the ominous pollution threat of the
VLCe. The IITorrey Canyonlt grounding in 1967 resulted in release

of some 36 million eallons of crude oil into the approaches to
the Enclish Channal and dressed the nearqy shores of France and
England with a gooey and pungent "chocolate mousse" emulsion
that took almost three years to dissipate and return the coast
to some degree of pre-pollution normalcy. Compared to the most
popular size VLCC ordered in 1973, the Torrey Canyon "Tas only
about one-third the size, thus the potential hazards from such
accidents is of vital concern to the Ooastal Zone.
iii

Besides the danger of grounding, tankers are vulnerable to
collision from which some oil pollution is almost always evident.
Fire and explosion constitute other hazards to tankers, and are
perhaps more feared by the crews, but vilie-encs towards them is
more sentinel and results in less incidental pollution than the
hazards of collision or grounding. There has been considerable
progress in reducing the fire/explosion risk much of it in the
form of mandatory regulation, but also voluntary because of the
tremendous investment represented by the VLCC. The "eggs-in-onebasket" concept has stimulated shipowners into designing into
the VLCC advanced technoloEies which if used properly can enhance
vessel safety physically and operat.Lonal.Iy, Nwnerous governmental
and 1nparticularly the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultive Organization (TI1CO) have taken active roles in the reduction of risks
from collision or groundings by introducing Bea traffic separation
schemes and changes to the Rules of the Road.
In constructing this paper, one of the .p robl ems that confronted

me was that I didn't have the opportunity to refresh my memory by

.'

first hand experience on board a VLCe either in service or under
construction, and I had to rely on

~

somewhat vague recollections

of a VLCC tour taken in 1969. The hoped for discussions with shipyard personnel and/or ship's officers would have been extremely
helpful had they taken place.
The main problem in researching the subject was not in

iv

finding rules and regulations on the subject of shipbuilding or
ship operations, but in putting together lithe nature of the beast".
By far, the vast majority of my material was derived from articles
in periodical magazines, as many as £ive or six on the sarne subject from which I was able to piece together a reasonably accurate

explanation or description. Lacking a technical background, I had
some heavy steaming through such material as llPrinclples of Naval
Architecture ll for example.

I have been fortunate in gaining timely assistance from
several individuals who nave helped me considerably in piecing
together this paper. I am grateful to CO:r.IDIander Nilliarn E. Turcotte, USN, holder of the Land Chair o£ Merchant Marine Affairs
at the Naval ,,'ar College, for his advise and background material,
to Professor B. Vincent Davis, Director of the Patterson School
of Diplomacy at the University of Kentucky, for his timely assist
in

providing me material on oil transport, and to Miss Doris Baginski

of the Naval \-Jar College Mahan Library staff for her assistance in
digging out research material.
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EVOLUTION OF THE SUPERTANKER
PART I

INTRODUCTION
Background. I think most people will agree that the economy
of the world today is essentially an "oil economy". ":1 thout crude
petroleum, what would our lives be like? If, for example, all the
oil wells in the

~uddle

East had suddenly gone dr,y in the 1930s,

would we ever have experienced Horld

~var

II? One can only specu-

late on what today might be like without petroleum in sienificant
quantities.

~.~

in the United States are reminded of our heavy re-

liance on petroleum and its by products by the recent artificial
shortage of fuels which many of us have experienced only as a
, minor annoyance occasioned by the appearance of "sorry no gaa"
signs at the corner service station or as a sharp fluxuation in

the price paid for home heating oil. Elsewhere in the world the
reliance on petroleum is just as heavy in industrialized nations.
In fact, the United States is far more fortunate than most because
we have less total yeliance on oil imports than do manY others. In
Japan, the consumption of petroleum and petroleum products has trebled in the last ten years and is expected to increase again by a
factor

ot four

1
by 1990.

The Japanese rely almost totally on oil

imports to meet their rapidly increasine needs, with almost 90
per cent of that total imported from the Hiddle East. Similarly,

Europe's oil consumption has trebled since founding of the KEG

.
1

skills in ample supply. Thus with the increased demand of tanker
capacity, and the application of the assumption that a single
large ship can operate just as efficiently and at significantly
less total operating cost per cargo-ton mile than two or three
smaller ships of the same type, the ways were greased for the

supertanker.
Record Size Ships. Since 1956, the distinction of world's

largest ship has been claimed by tankers, one of them holding the
honor for only seven days. The following table 8hows the spectacular growth in ship size:

Table 1
Name
SINCLAIR PJ1~TROLORE
UNIVERSE LEAU":R

UNIVERSE APOLLO
l1ANHATTAN
NISSIlO MARU
IDEMITSU BAllU
UNIVE~E I:1E:L.4.ND
NISSEKI 11ARU
GLOBTIK TOKYO

Tons (rn-IT)

Year

56,089
85,515
104,520
108,590
130,250
206,000

1956
1957
1959

lfuere Built
Japan
Japan
Japan

1962

USA

1962

Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan

1966
326,000
1968
372,400
1971
483,644
1973
Source: Lloyd's lleeister of Ships, 1973-74

Clearly the Japanese are the leader in building ships of
'gr ea t size with the one exception, Nanhattan, built in the USA

as a token effort, holding the world's largest ship record for
only seven days. Currently the French are building two 500,000

dwt tankers and Aristotle Ona6518 has announced plans to build

3

a one million ton tanker. It is difficult to forses a technical
structural limit on the size of 'ships - the

pre6~nt

limits appear

to be economic and navigational. Economically limiting because of
cost va loss risk and navigationally limiting because of the ships
draught

consict~rations

and lack of port facilities.

Advantages of Size. There are munerous advantages to the VLCC.
First, although the total initial investment 'is greater, it takes

less labor, less steel and shipyard effort to build

8

single tank

ship to carry 300,000 tons of crude oil than it does to build six
50,000 ton capacity tankers or three 100,000 tanners. The savings
in steel is also a major concern and results from the fact that
the akin of arr:! container increases only as the square of its

dimensions, whereas the volume enclosed increases as the cube
using the formula V""a 3 • Lower operating costs are realized providing the VLCC operates in a steady trade in goods easy to load
- thJ.·s suits the VICe perfectly. In
and discharge in laree vo1 urne
economic terms the -¥Lee represents economy of scale, which can be
seen in Table 2 belo,"1, with compare tive

fuel consumption r~tes of

Table 2
DW TonnaGe

Consumption Per Day

(Tons)

DW Tons Carried Per Dny
Per Ton of Fuel U;:;ed.
3S0
533
912
1022*

1225*
*Extrapolated
Source: Phi"ilips-BiI"t an The Future
r

4

some representative size tankers between 1945 and 1970.
Essential to the profj.tabili ty of operating the

nce

must

be the opportunity to persi.stantly operate with high load ratios.
The long-term certainty that the VLCC will have a load ratio of

50 per cent - fully loaded one way and empty, or in ballast the
other - is an important reason for increasing size. In 1967, ftdth
the closure of the Suez Canal, this wisdom began to pay off wi th
some 155 tankers operating the routes between the Persian Gulf
and the Uo 30 and Europe that could not pass through the Canal
fully loaded, and whose size made the 60 day round trip compet-

itive with the Suez route used by smaller tankers.

As with every business, economic disaster would befall the
owners and operators of VLGCs if there is not reasonable certainty
of their being able to maintain adequate and profitable load ratios

during their lifetimes. According to a recent article appearing in

}~rine Engineering/LOg,3

tankers represent 69 per cent of the ship-

building orders for 1973 with the most lIpopular size" VLCC on order
.

f

at 380,000 dwt. It would appear quite sa e

t

0

ass

urns

that with

the

oil economy such as the world has today. and with oil consuming
nations both increasing in number £100 total demand, favorable
load ratios for VLCr,s can be anticipated for many years ahend

o

; nt at which thG size of tankers will
The po•
saving of transport costs per ton mile
begin to shoW decline in the
How Big Is Dig?

of cargo is uncertain. A crucial situation will be reached when
the size of the ship is more than can be propelled by a single
engine and propeller because (1) there will be a loss of propulsion efficiency with twin screws and (2) construction will
become more complicated and expensive thereby offsetting economy
of size. To answer the question, how big is big, we can use some
simple comparisons to attempt an answer. Appendix I shows comparative growth in deadweight capacity of tank ships with the areas
of the squares being roughly proportional to rleadweieht tonnage.
Comparative lengths of the ships are indicated by the heavy hor-

izontal lines. The proportions shown are supported by a simple
mathematical computation where a cube"measuring in any units,
for example - 20 x 3 x 2 - will have a volume of 120 uni t a,
Take another cube; to dffilble the volume to 240 units, all one

needs to do is increase the measurements to 24 x

4x

2~ units.

In other words, to double the displacement of the dwt of a ship,
length, one third in
an increase of approximate ly one f ~orth ;n
~
beam and one fourth" in draught, or any combination thereof will
suffice.
The Million Ton Ship.
made

As mentioned earlier, plans are being

for the constNction of a million rlwt tanker - an Ultra Large

Crude Carrier (ULCC). It in projected. too tthe vessel will measure
et in length, ~
. ·11 have a beam of 300 feet,
approximately 2,000 fe
There is no question
and a draught of 100 feet, probably more.

6

that a prestige will attach itself to the country, the shipyard
and the owner that launches the first million tanner - a prestige
similar to that enjoyed by the U. S. from putting the first man
on the moon. Hecently, two Japanese shipbuilding companies made

public their plans to construct dr,ydock facilities capable of
handling a

~illion

ton vessel, and another group, headed by

Aristotle Onassis, has discussed a somewhat revolutionary million
ton ULCC they mieht conat.rnct.,

Earlier I noted that the larger a tanker gets, the cheaper
the per barrel transportation cost becomes. But there is a curious phenomena, laying somewhere between the 483,644 dwt "Globtik
.Tokyoll Claso ULCC and the one million ton tanker, which reverses
the economies of scale.

~mval

architects are not sure about the

actual size at which such a reversal takes place, but most of

them with experience in VLCC/ULCC design and construction agree
that at Bome point approaching a million tons, the cost per dwt
will escalate rapidly.

4

.

This increased cost per dwt will be em-

phasized in the early efforts at the million ton ship. T~e "Globtik
Tokyo" was contracted for at slightly under $49 million.

The

cost for a million ton ship (1913 dollars in a Japanese shipyard)
6
has been esti.mated as high as $130 million.
Andrew Spyrou, Technical Director of the Onassis group,
points out that Onnssis' decision in 19» to build a 47,000 dwt
tanker, which began the era of giant tankers, was thought '?Y

7

many people to be impraotical. Spyrou's credo for tanker construction is: "An owner should select a design keeping in mind
that optimum deadweight to give miniJnum building cost is of
lesser importance than the selection of the optimum deadweieht
7
to give min:i.Jnum operating cost." This philosophy J combined with
some creative so Iutdons to emerging international tanker regulations, has led to design of the "Delta System Ship."
The Delta Ship.

The Onassis' Delta Ship advances modular

design and in doing so sidesteps many of the problems seen in
the bUilding and operation of a million ton tanker. The Delta
"mothershipll would be used for clean ballast only, would carry
all main propulsion fuel, accomodate the main propulsion systmn,
crew, and equipment to process the contaminated ballast from
four detachable modules or caissons. The four caissons would
carry petroleum only and each would be equipped with its own
pumping facilities to handle cargo and ballast.
Distributtng eargo in four 250,000 dwt detachable caissons
has a number of advantages. Existing pump teclmology and systems
can be applied to them, and construction carried out in a dry-

dock in series, or production line method. Since the total ship
is not intended to enter port and since individual caisson
draucht would be considerably less than the complete Delta ship,

port depths become less a factor.

8

It is conceivable that the Delta ship could carr,y four

to.tally different products on the same voyage, particularly in
view of the fact that thera are ver,y few (if any) oil dumps or
refineries that could accomodate one million tons of crude oil
at one time. P.cologists sh0uld have no more

arL~ement

with the

Delta configuration because it is essentially four, 250,000 dwt
tankers arranged in close order. A groundd.ng or a collision would
represent no more danger than a similar mishap to a present-day
250,000 tanner. Following cargo discharges,

ba~lasted

caissons

would be towed back to the mothership where they would be fitted
in place. Final ballasting for voyage would trim the Delta ship
so she actually "rides" on the caissons.
Even with these innovative concepts, there are numerous
problems to be solved before construction could be attempted.
Mooring lines and winches of adequate size and power

h~ve

yet

to be developed. Directional and course stability problems require considerable research in hull configuration and rudder
design to make such a large vessel responsive to small rudder
angles. The vessel's anticipated sluggishness and unpredictable
response, plus man's traditional tendency to oversteer (when a
ship is steered manually) can cause excessive fuel consumption
over and above the expected norm of SOO tons a day for a lh knot
8
cruising speed.
Then there is the problem of routine hull maintenance and/or emergency repairs, because of virtually non-existing

9

drydocking facilities. It is hard to imagine how cumbersome a
million ton ship would be. A Norwegian study points out that few
tugs exist today that could manage a million tons even under the
i..

ca~st

of seas. There will not be much flexibility in routing

such a large ship oither. She would probably ply between a

ver~

few ports and as a result insurance rates might be higher. One
Japanese firm noted that the bigger tankers become, the more risk
increases, consequently higher insurance rates are applied.
As for crew, operating companies would want to ensure comfort and relaxation of the highest quality to make berth aboard
the million ton ship a coveted one. Since the ship would seldom
enter any port, there would likely ·be a swilnming pool, gym, sauna,
bowling alley, etc. Since the ship doesn't go where man wants to

go, a helo pad would be a requirement for crew rotation and shuttling them to land. Quarters would be plush, with three bedroom
apartments possibly available for the ship's officers and their
families should they choose to take them to sea. There is little

. .

doubt that the million ton tanker would be a very comfortable
ship.
There are many obstacles to overcome, but these are the

same obstacles that confronted the 250,000 ton tanker. The only
possible answer to the quention of how soon construction of the
million ton tanker may begin is - sooner than you might think.

10

Design Characteristics of Operating VLCCs.

The "eggs-in-

one-basket" philosophy has led to special care in construction
and manning considerations for VLCCs. The

~ecently

completed and

now operational, 48J,6U4 dwt Globtik Tokyo, provides some advanced
design concepts in vessel safety that reduce the range of hazards
and extent of pollution in event of an accident. Her hull strength
(longitudinal and transverse) form, superstructure, piping systems
and propulsion systems are all specially designed to minimize the
cost of maintenance and guarantee seaworthiness. All plates used
in deck and hull construction are of one inch mild steel. Because
of Globtik Tokyo's greater depth compared to her length, HT steel
was not used. After completion of the ship, static stress measurements were made at more than 100 points to ascertain vessel safety
and the reliability of design

calcula~tons

concerning bending stress

highly satisfactor,y..
The programmed occupancy ratio of

SO

per cent (fully loaded

one way and empty or in ballast the other) has had an effect on
hull design for the VLCCs to improve shiphandline· A very pro.nounced type

0

f

bulb ous b 0-101, approprJ."at el y called a uramil bow,

has gained most favor and may extend 20-40 feet ahead of the
stem just below the waterline. The original desir,n concept of
the bulbous bow is to reduce the bow wave system, hovever because

11

the VLCCs are so wide of beam, the bulb had little effect in
cancelling the surface bow wave resistance. Instead, it was discovered that the bulb tended to reduce drag along the keel. Tank
tests have shown that certain designs of bulbous bows may reduce
9
water resistance by as much as 25 per cent.
This is an important
factor in VLCC operating efficiency.
Globtik Tokyo's designers incorporated desisn concepts in

the hull that provided a "honeycombll strength, cost effectiveness
and an element of pollution control. The ship is designed with
three longitudinal cargo taru{ systems divided by oiltight bulkheads. Because the designers placed limits on tank capacity, the
outboard tanks instead of having wash type bulkheads, are provided
with oiltight bulkheads. Thus the outboard cargo tames are compartmentalized so that a rupture in the skin of the ship would effect
only the tank(s) or space where the opening occurred. B,y comparison,

the double bottom design offers greater pollution protection from
a htul rupture, but such a design also increases the cost of construction significantly.
Mobil Shipping Company Ltd. has incorporated the double
bottom desien into its tanker fleet with the 212,000 dwt tanker

IIMobil Pegasus ll • This new deGign is intended to reduce port turnaround times since loading and ballasting cun be carried out at
the same time. It also guards against spillage of oil in event

of a groundang - a further step in Mobil l s uClean Seas Pr-ogram"

12

begun in 1965, which is intended, by application of various
10
measures to prevent pollution and increase safety at sea.
The
Mobil Pegasus haa a ten foot high apace that separates the underside of the cargo tanks from the bottom of the hull and extonds
the length of

t~e

careo section of the ship. A central tunnel in

the double bottom includes all the suction piping and valves for
cargo discharge. The location of the piping and valves has the
advantages of allowing complete cargo dischargo without crew
11
~'mucking rr .

It also protects the piping system from corrosion

by alternate immersion in oil and seawater. The double bottom
includes flooding alarms and a gas detection system. Mobil claims
the double bottom design proVides

'gre ~te r

transverse strength

which could alleviate ono of the principal strength problems
facing builders of VLCCs. Some of the design detail of Mobil
Pegasus is shO\nl in Appendix II.
Built In Gafety and Anti-Pollution Devices/l1ethods.

On Globtik Tokyo

a~

well as on almost all cargo carrier3 being

built today the superDtructure and engineering spaces are 10cated aft. The accomodations and ship's control spaces when 10cated over the engineering space are separated from the propulsion
spaces

below

by

a one meter deep "dead space" in cons Ider'atd.on of

rules p;overning oxplosion protection. Special care is also taken
in dampening to prevent vibrations from machiner,y and screw beat.

I)

An inert gas system has been designed and installed aboard

Globtik Tokyo for tank explosion prevention. This system sends
inert stack gas into the cargo oil tanks when empty as well as
when unloading crude oil in order to reduce the oxygen content
in the tanks .shich minimizes the risk of explosion. For an explosion to take place, the oxygen content must

excee~

11 per cent

by volume, and hydrocarbons between 2-10 per cent. A particularly

dangerous period occurs during the unloading phase of crude oil
where air will enter the tanks as the cargo is discharged thus
12
creating an explosion danger by increasing the 02 ratio. By
adding a mixture of CO2 and Sulphur Dioxide to the stack exhaust
and passing it through seawater "scrubbers ll that cool the gas
and clean most of the 802 from it, then blowing the gas into the

tames, the oil vapor/oxygen mixture is greatly diluted and the
danger of explosion is significantly reduced. Several companies
have marketed inert gas systems of this type that can be retrofitted on older design tankers - and while the equipment is expensive, and heavy (50 tons or more) it can be installed while
the ship is underway with a minimum of outsido assistance. The
installation saves money in the long run through reducod insurance rates and potential ship repair/replacement costs, not to
mention increased crew and vessel safety. To date however, there
are no rules safeguarding taw<ers from empty tank explosions primarily because there has never been a totally accepted reason

An inert gas system has been designed and installed aboard

Globtik Tokyo for tank explosion prevention. This system sends
inert stack gas into the cargo oil tanks when empty as well as
when tu1loading crude oil tn order to reduce the o;;cygen content
in the tanks 'Hhich minimizes the risk of explosion. For an explosion to take place, the oxygen content must exceed 11 per cent
by volume, and hydrocarbons between 2-10 per cent. A particularly
dangerous period occurs during the unloading phase of crude oil
where air will enter the tanlcs as the cargo is discharged thus
12
creating an explosion danger by increasing the 02 ratio. By
adding a

mixt~re

of CO2 and Sulphur Dioxide to the stack exhaust

_ and passing it through seawater

II

scrubbers" that cool the gas

and clean most of the S02 from it, then blowing the gas into the
tanks, the oil vapor/oxygen mixture is greatly diluted and the
danger of explosion is significantly

re~uced.

Several companies

have marketed inert gas systems of this type that can be rotrofitted on older design tankers - and while the equipment is expensive, and heavy (50 tons or more) it can be installed while
the ship is underway with a minimum of outsido assistance. The
installation saves money in the long run through reduced insurance rates and potential ship repair/replacement costs, not to
mention increased crew and vessel safety. To date however, there
are no

rule~ safe~larding tar~ers

from empty tank explosions -

primarily because there has nevor been a totally accepted reason

given for them. Nonetheless, in the face of mute testimony from
ships having suffered tank explosions - Universe Patriot, Seven
Seas, Ocean Bridge ($2.7 rn.i.llion in damage) and Nactra to nama
only a few - shipowners arB showing increased interest in inert
gas system retrofits. Appendix III provides a schematic drawing
of a typical inert gas system arrangement.
Again, using the G1obt1k Tokyo as an example, cargo oil
piping incorporates many new devices to shorten the cargo handling time, but also to reduce the chance of accidental oil spills.
At the unloading port, wing tanks are unloaded first then filled
with seawater ballast through a separate pumping system. The ability to load ballast while discharging t,he oil cargo allo-ws the
tanker to leave port as soon as unloading is completed. At the
loading port, the" ship can take on cargo while discharging the
ballast water. Oil/water separators are used to reduce the oil
water mixture and prevent oily discharges above minimum pollution
standards established by DiCG.

13

. .

Some time ago, major oil companies adopted the llload-on-top"
(LOT) method of reducing or preventing oil pollution. This procedure is used by an estimated 80 por cent of all oil tankers in
operation today. It consists basi.cally of. collecting all oil,
contaminated ballast and tank washings is a slop tank. After the
oil and water are separated the relatively clean 'iater is pumped
overboard until the oil water interface 1s reached. The next

oil cargo 1s loaded on top of the oily sludge in the tank bottom.

To be effective, the LOT method requires that any oil which re-

14

mains in the piping systom or

a5

clingage ' i n the

ta~~s ~Thich

are to be washed, and ,..,hieh otherwise might be discharged into
the sea, shall be collected and processed, transferred to a
common holding tank and stripped so that the wnount actually
dumped overboard is a very small percentage of the residue left

aboard. Providing the method is in the hands of "e;ood ll operators
more than 99 per cent of the oil previously dumped at sea, can
be reprocessed.

Tank cleaning on Globtik Tokyo is accomplished by stationary
type units installed in each of her 21, cargo

tank~.

The cleaning

water is transferred by the cargo oil pumps under pressure to the
tank cleaning piping system. The water is removed from the tanka
after cleaning bJr ectuctors or self stripping devices. Sach tank
haa several openings for sludge removal which is transferred to
slop tanks for oil/water separation.
Fire prevention has advanced further than moat other safety
measures with fire reaistant and/or retardant materials, smoke
detectors, automatic smothering devices using foam and C02' purple
K and so on. uhen the liner United States

'WaS

completed a number-

of years ago, it was said that the only two things onboard that
would burn were the piano and the butcher I s chopping b'Lo ck ~ Vith
th.8 relatively small crews on board the VLr:Cs, the importance of
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building ships that are defliBned not to catch fire or at least
will retard the growth of a fire giving the crew enough time to
put it out, is an extremeIy important step.
Crew Size and Automation.

Traditional concepts of seafaring

have been associated with 1,he discomfort of cramped quarters and
a lack of anything but the minimwn of privacy for anyone. Not so
today, accomodations aboarrt VLCCs are plush and creature comforts
extensive. They have to be. The largest VLCC may have a crew of
perhaps 35 (Olobtik Tokyo has a comnliment of 39) which nu.ght, include four each deck and engineer officers and perhaps eight each
of crew for deck and engineering. Total watchstanders underway
will rarely exceed three or four men. Increasingly, enginerooms
and boiler rooms will be unmanned for much of the time with the
entire plant monitored from a remote console. The old chores of
maintenance at sea are all but eli.minated with innovative noW"
paints and anti-corro3ive coatings and what maintenance is performed is usually

d~ferred

to time in port or annual upkeep per-

iods. The ship has become a huge and sparsely inhabitert island.
The VLCCs are indeed a dilema to the seaman, as Ralph Hewins
wrote in an article appearine in the London Times,

liAs

tankers

got bigger and crew size decreases, the problem of lonliness
mounts. The officers and mon tend to lose touch with reality sometimes Buffering the agonizing biological fears of the prisoner

11

of war - and a general melancholy sets in, which occastonally
lands the victim of

thea~

unnatural surroundings in a straight

jacket••••• One might envision as the approaching ideal, after
studying the mass of electronic navigational equipment available
today, ships exceeding 500;000 tons under the control of one man
lolling before a bridge console pressing a button from time to
time. Then there will be the last button which, unpressed and
by some super-sensitive means, will transmit the

~arning

(to whom

is uncertain; perhaps the owners a few thousand JfIiles away ashore)
that the man has died at his station or gone mad; while the ship
steams on, directed by its computer mind, automatically steered,
course automatically plotting itself, automatically warned of
collision, maklng its own pre-planned changes of course, fully
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programmed to meet all emergencies.
Use of

Com~uters

in Ship's Control.

The trend towards

automation by use of compact solid-state computers in shiprs
control systems- ha3 been gaining momentum over the last few
years. Several U. S. s!lips have been computerized and one, the

38,000 ton, 641 foot, H/V llSugar Islander", has been certified

16
by the U. S. r-oast Guard to operate with an unmanned

enginel~om.

The engineering crew of the Sugar Islander has been reduced to
six man, a Chief Fneineer and two other officers, two qualified
enginemen and a wiper. Of course being a diesel ship, her engin-
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that automatically shuts down operation in a programmed sequence
when abnormal conditions occur such as low water in the boiler,
fan failures, gas/air heater

failure~,

etc. The engineering plant

is however desiened to use the most modern and compact equipment
having long life and low mAintenance characteristics without which
automated control systems would be fraught with difficulties.
Anti-Collision Devices and Automated Navieation Systems.
To paraphrase one of the oldest sayings of sailors, "a collison
at sea can ruin your entire day," in fact, it could ruin your
entire company uhere a VLee becomes involved. A rupture in only
one tank on an average size VLCe could dU1l1P as much as 50 ,000
tons of oil into the sea. (Torrey Canyon lost over 100 ,000 tons
of crude) Probable lawsuits that could result from such an accident could add up to a tremendous amount of money. It makes good
sense therefore for a ship o,mer to utilize the most advanced
ship's gUidance and anti-collision devices available.
F.ssentially a collision avoidance system is no more than
a computerized radar whi"ch correIa tea data from as many as

64

separate "cont.act.s" or othe r ships wi thin a given range, displays
this information to the deck watch officer, and provides warning
of those ships which will approach within a given distance or
which have no appreciable bearing drift. There are a number of

17

such systems on the market in a variety of sophistications.
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find their way into predominance. Their reasons were quite simply
the higher costs of maintenance for steam plants compared to gas
turbines and the assumption that nuclear power had too far to go
to be economically acceptable and operationally reliable.
Nuclear power- propulsion systems may not be so far off as
Ohashi and Kemota seem to think. The reason is evident, the

h~gh

price of fUel oil. Another is the rising coat of VLCCs - approaching $100 million each. At these prices the estimated $25 million
cost for a high performance 120,000 shp nuclear power ' plant becomes
21
less significant.
There is the added return of hieher speed from
nuclear power that will enable a VLCC to make more trips per year

_than the conventionally powered VLCC. Such an investment could result in a tremendous payoff for the shipping company that goes
nuclear.
VLCC Shiphandling Characteristics.

In 1957 it was said by

a leading naval architect that "a supertanker can be as dangerous
22
a t sea as an expres-s train without brakes".
This may be overstating the case as it is today, but it is clear that the increased
size of ships is producing a new set of maritime problems.
Nid

si~ed

VLCGs of 200,000 dwt will run on for 10 miles or

more after storpine the enr,inos if no furtllor action is taken.

In part, the very existance of VLCCs 1s due to the economical
low power propulsion systems installed per ton of ship that still
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provides an adequate speed. This fact, together with single screw

design, severely limits maneuverability. The free running distance
may be reduced by reversing engines to a distance of about

2.5 mi

for a 200,000 dwt tanker (5000 nautical yards) assuming the ship

23
was proceeding a t full speed be fore reversing engi.nes ,

As a rule

of thumb, astern hor-sepower' is about one-third of the ahead hp due

to propeller and steam turbine designs. The use of water brakes,
such as flapped rudders whose side plates are hinged on the leading
edge, which may be opened to about

35 degrees on each side of the

centerline to receive the braking action of the propeller slipstream, water parachutes, drogue anchors and other types of brake
flaps have all been tried at one time

or another but with no real

solution to the problem of absorbing the tremendous stresses involved. The magnitude of the control problem can be appreciated by
comparison of the liner United States and a typical sized VLCC five
times the weight of the liner but with only one-eighteenth of the
power per ton installed!
The most important factor in connection with collision and
groundings - two of the most corrmon casualties that can occur to
a ship - is the

II

crash stop" or,

II

emergency atop" ability. Unfor-

tunately, tho abilit.y of the VLCG5 to come to an emerf,E'lncy stop
a8

compared to smaller vessels, has decreased as size has increased.

~ile

there has been an enormous increase in the size of tankers

23

their speed has

re~~ined

rather constant at

14

to 17 knots or,

about the same as the l!orld Har II T-2 tankers. The fully loaded
cruising speed of the

24

14.68 knots.

483,644

dvrt Globtik To)cyo for example is

Since the energy to be absorbed in stopping a

ship is directly proportional to her displacement, the distance
and time required to bring her to an emergency stop from nlll
ahead has increased tremendously. This can be seen Vividly by
comparing a 17,000 dwt T-2 tanker, which can come to an emergency
stop within a half a mile in five minutes, with the stopping distance for a 200,000 dwt

nec

vrhich requires approximately 2/>5 miles

and takes 21 minutes. By extrapolation, for the 500,000 dwt VLCC,
the straight line stopping distance for an emergency stop would
be about

4.S

the period of

to

5 miles

backin~

and would take nearly 30 minutes. During

full, the ship's master is unable to steer

her or regulate the speed. In yet another awesome fact, the engines
on Globtik Tokyo were stopped and not put astern during sea trials.
It took the vessel in excess of one hour to run her way off and
come to a complete stop. To add to these phenomena is the factor
that as speed of the VLCC decreases its maneuverability drops
of'f' sharply. At half speed for example the VLCC is virtually unmaneuverable. "!hat all this means is that the crews who navigate
these ships must exercisa a much higher deeree of vilir;ence, and
be able to anticipate their next maneuver.
The inability of the VLCC to stop within a reasonably short
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than the forward light. Owing to the design of VLCCs, the after
light is carried on the radar mast above the after superstructural
This means that there may be a distance of from 700 to 900 feet
or more horizontally between the two lights. It is not so surprising that an

obsel~er

on another vessel could mistake the

lights for two vessels instead of a single ship 1,000 feet or
more in length. This did in fact happen in a collision in Tokyo
Bay between the 1,135 foot Universe 'Daphne and a small merchant

freighter because the master of the smaller vessel believed the
Universe Daphne to be two separate vessels. To solve this midship lighting problem for the VICCs, the U. S. delegation to the

1972 IMCO Rules of the Road

Confer~nce.suggested

that a Rule sim-

ilar to Rule 9 of the U. S. Great Lakes Rules which requires the
long Great Lakes are carriers to show a white light every 100 feet
along the main deck, be adopted. This Rule

h35

been in effect on

the Great Lakes since 1895, and since that time, there have been
no collisions caused

.

by

an ore carrier being mistaken for

tUQ

.

vessels. However helpful this U. S. suggestion might appear, I
can see a problem with it because the Great Lakes ore carriers
are designed with their pilot houses and conning stations in the
fore part of the ship whereas the VLCGs invariably have their
pilot houses and conning stations aft. The lumination from the
numerous lights along the hull of the VLCC, even when shielded
from direct view of the crew, would no doubt cause a deterioration
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of night vision for the bridge watch that would defeat the purpose of such lighting. I don't believe that lights ever,y 100 feet
are necessary, and would suggest use of blue lights every 200 feet
or perhaps a different mastheat/rangelight arrangemont that might
include three lights, ie., two range lights on the same horizontal
plane aft separated by at least

15

feet. Meanwhile, in waitL,g for

the new Rules to ·be ratifip.d and placed in effect (no earlier than

1976) some

nee

masters are following the practice of sailing ships

which, when underway in congested waters will reflect f'Loodl i.ght.s
off their sails. The VLGCa (noted in Japanese waters) are illuminating the superstructure and midships sections of their vessels
with lights not specifically provided for in the present Rules.

The result is that there is a rapid trend towards distinctive
lights on ships outside the Rules which does not solve any problem except perhaps for the VLCC.
To give an example of how confusing and tramnatic lights at
sea can be, I was once in a fonnation of 20 Navy ships in the
1~~estern

I1editerranean, steaming at darken ship (no lights showing)

with two aircraft carriers and two cruisers in the center of the
formation about which sixteen destroyers were arranged in a double
circular screen. Sometime during the night the formation entered
into a meeting s i.t.uat.Lon with a well lighted merchant veasel , The
formation remained darkened until the merchantman had penetrated
the screen of destroyers. The Officer in Tactical Command had
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given a signal for all shipe to maneuver independently to avoid
shipping but as the sit.uation deteriorated someone must have alerted the Admiral to the potentially dangerous situation and he
ordered the formation to light ship. The merchantman became confused and disoriented and immediately changed course - right into
1

the path of one of the carriers and a collision occurred.

Thus

there is the arguement of no lights, too many lights or, a lack
of good judgement. Perhaps there was a little of each. I have
mentioned this incident only because it points out the fact that
lights at sea can reveal, confuse and/or conceal and there must
be a single prescribed rule for lights for all to follow.
~~at

is Safe Speed?

In part I, the so-called emergency-

stop characteristic of vter.s was discussed. One of the most im-

portant ramifications of the inability to stop lnthin a reasonably short distance is that most of the very large tankers, the
VLCCs an d the UJ..CGs. cannot. ope ra te today wi thin the re e t ri c ti ons

established hy the present Rules of the Road.
Rule 16 of the present aules states:

"Every vessel, ••••••••• , shall, in fog, mist, falling
snow, heavy rainsto~IS or any other conditions similarly
restrictL~g visibility, go at a moderate speed, having
careful regard to the existing circumstances and conditions. 1I
The admiralty courts have almost always held that Jlmoderate
speed ll is the speed at which a vessel can stop within one-half

]3

the distance of visibility. Since a ¥LCe cannot"be maneuvered
readily when moving much below half speed, and not at all (for
all means and purposes) below five knots, and cannot be stopped
in less than two or three miles, the inability of such ships to
comp~

with this rule is apparent. To

co~ply

would mean that the

largest VLCC would have to come to a complete stop whenever the
visibility decreased to less than five milesl There is no easy
solution to this perplexity for to change or relax the Rule
would be chaotic for the majority of merchant vessels.
Traffic Separation Schemes.

In 1966, the total volume of
2

seaborne oil moved by 3,654 ocean tankers was 935 million tons.
By

1983, the total volume of oil moved by sea is forecast to be

3,350 million tons by 4,400 tankers, and

by the turn of the cen-

tury, a volume of 13,400 million tons is projected.

3
These are

clear indicators of the magnitUde of the navigational problem
for the

fut\~e

and the "need for traffic control or, separation,

to minimize the

~ollision

risk between ships plying the same

shipping routes.
A further need for ship routing has evolved from the ex-

ploitation of off3horc petroleum and natural gas discoveries.
'l;li th

several hundred mobile and stationary drilling ri.gs on the

open sea, each valued from 5 - 50 million dollars, located all
over the world, the dilineation of Ilfairways" for ships has be-
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come a necessity. In

1964, Great Britain passed a law making it

illegal for ships to approach within 500 moters of any drilling
rig, principally to prevent, wake damage and the possibility of
a blowout. Gary Knight points out that the existing system of
voluntary shipping safety fairways utilized by the U. S. in the
Gulf of Mexico has not been particularly effective and that it

may be necessary to

asse~t

some limited proprietary riehts in

areas of the hieh seas to protect the international communities
interest in safe navigation by

desi~nating

certain corridors as

4
mandatory routes for shipping.

A significant accomplishment of the 1972 D1CO Rules of the
.Road revision has been the consolidation of a variety of traffic
separation schemes into a well defined set of mandatory reeulationa which will apply to only traffic control schemes approved
by IMCO. The traffic schemes have been listed in an ll1CO publi-

cation

5

which includes a list of advisories for operating in and

around sea lanes and traffic separation schp,mes. Because of the
significance of this nule I think it is appropriate to quote and

comment upon it. The propolled Hule states:
Rule 10
Traffic
(a)
(b)

~;oparation

3chemes

This rule applies to traffic separation schemes
adopted by the organization.
1

vesuel using a traffic separation scheme shall:
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(i)

(c)

(d)

Proceed in the appropriate traffic lane
in the eeneral direction of traffic flow
for that lane;

(ii)

So far as practicable keep clear of a
traffic s~paration line or separation zone;

(iii)

Nonnally ,join Or leave a traffic lane at
the termination of the lane, but when joining or leaving from the side shall do so at
::16 sm"lll an tlnele to tho general direction
of traffi~ flow as practicable.

A vessel shall so far as practicable avoid crossing
a traffic lane, but if obli~ed to do so shall cross
as nearly as practicable at rieht angles to the general direction of traffic flow.
Inshore traffic zones shall not normally be used
by through traffic which can safely use the appro-

priate traffic lane within the adjacent traffic
separation scheme.
(e)

A vessel, other than a crossing vessel, shall not
normally enter a soparation zone or cross a separation line except:

(i)

In cases of emergency to avoid immediate
danger;

(ii) To eneagc in fishing within a separation
zone.
(f)

A vessel.navigat.ing in areas near the termination of

traffic separation schemes shall do so with particular
caution.
(g)

A vessel shall, so far as practicable, avoid anchoring
in a trafric separation scheme or in areas near its
tennination.

(h)

A vessel not using a traffic separation scheme shall
avoid it by as wide a margin as is practicable.

(i) A vessel engaged in fiGhing sWlll not 'impede the passage of any vessel followi.ng a traffic lane.
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might involve major dar.lago and pollution from a fully loaded
VLCC. The Japanese ports .. all of them - are among the most

congested in the world, as anyone who has ever transited the

Inland Sea or steamed up Tolc,yo Bay will readily agree. In 1973
Japan enacted a

V~ritime

special rules for vessel

Traffic Safety Law which establishes
~ovement5

under the control of the

6
Harl time Safe ty Agency (1'1SA).

Two types of vessels are subject to the rules and regulations set forth under the new

1a1"1

(1) ships over 200 meters in

length (640 feet) and (2) nhips laden with dangerous cargos such
as liquid natural gas or explosi.ves or certain chemicals. r.:ssen_tially the rules are divided into three sections which are:
(a)

the display of underway signals by day and night,

(b)

the filing of a plan of intonded movement over pre-

scribed routes established by the liSA,
(c)

compliance "lith the advisory instructions issued by

rfSA control offices.

The underway si13nals are the sarnA as those menti.oned in
the foregoing under Rule 28 for vessels "constrained by draught ll •
The difference is that veasel.s over 200 meters \-Thich must carry
the special sf.gnn.L may be highly maneuverab l.e and not, conct.r-af.ncd
by draught. This conflicts with the I11CO llule chango , Vesscls

carrying dangerous cargos are required to fly the Bravo flag by

)8

(j) A v~ssel of less than 20 meters in length, or a
saili.ng ves sel, "hall not irtpede the safe passage
of a power driven vessel following a traffic lane.
The importance of traffic separation and traffic lanes is
emphasized by the VLCC which cannot maneuver smartly and must
look seven or eight miles ahead and think a half hour ahead to
keep out of trouble. One of the busiest waterways in the world,
the English Channel, has a voluntary traffic separation scheme
which many think should become mandatory. An IMCO publication,
It

Ships I Routeing and Traffic Separation Schemes" describes the

English Channel Syntem as folloW's:
liThe eepar-atd.on of trn.ffic in the area is achieved by its
divioion by natural obstacles situated along the middle
parts of the Strait.
'.
Traffic lanes of the scheme are areas between the
ob~tacles mentioned above and boundaries of the inshore
traffic zone defined below.
It is recornmcnd~d that the north-east bound ships
should use tho passa~e near the French coast, ~~li15t
ships movinf, in the opposite direction should navie~te
in the passaee between Sandettie-Varne Baru{s and the
English coast •••
The ar-rows printed on the chart to indicate tracks
are intended to D.ve the general direction of traffic
now only; ships nee-I not set their courses strictly
along the arrows ;"
Appendix IV provides

~

general idea of the overall traffic

control scheme which ll1GO has approved.
Japanese JI'!arltime Safety IJ<lw of 1973.

Nations such as

Japan that arc so dependent on waterborne conunerce cannot risk
the high cost of maritime accidents, particularly those which
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significantly, however traffic density has. There are a number
of reasons for this, greater concentration of ship movements on
'1

a limited number of trade routes, increased vessel size which

limi ts the ports in which t,he Lar-ger vessels can be accomoda tod
and the increased time a ship spends at sea. In the case of the

VLee, appro::d.me.tely 80 per cent of her time is spent in transit.
Along ;dth this increase in traffic density, the hazards of col1iaion have also increased from an average of less than 100 per
year in the ten year period 1950 - 1960 to an averaee of over

7
ISO per year in the ten years from 1960 - 1970.

Yet when this

somewhat alarming statistic is compared to other marine hazards
_such as groundinGs or fires and explosions, it ranks a far third
with percentages of

44,

8
15 and 12 respectively.

In other words,

in an average year, using t.he 1960-1970 figures, we can expect

66 vessels to run aground, about 23 that will be victims of fi.re
and/or explosiona and 18 in collisions. Since it usually takes
two ships to make a collisjon, this means an average of only 9
such accidents where accidental pollution might result. Further,

the percentage of collisions occuring on the open sea is just
9 per cent of thE! total for all collisions and herein lies the
most significant reason for the establishment of traffic scparation schemos , The hir;her

j

ncidence (91 per cent) of co Ll.t at ons

within the coastal zones subjects the area
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t~

creater incidental

pollution, real and potential. With regard to the greatest pollution threat - tankers,

25

per cent of collisions at sea involve

tanker types due largely to the increased time this type spends
a t sea compared to othe r type vessels. In other words, the ri sk
of collision for a tanker is about one in four in any given year.

As the tanker fleet increases in numbers over the next decade,
as many predict it will, the risk of collision most likely will
increase too as will the incidence of accidental oil spills.
The 1972 IY.CO revision to the Rules of the Road might seem
to

eo

overboard ,vith regard to the prevention of collision, but

in view of the location such accidents mostly occur, the emphasis
seems to be justified. The impositlon 'Of mandatory sea lanes and
traffic separation scheJ:les would be a step in the right direction
to\olards minimizing the number one hazard to ships, that of running
aeround. If such a Rule was in effect in 1967, the Torrey Canyon
disaster might not of occurred. The most unfortunate result of
groundings is that almost always they occur within the coastal
zone and result in almost one-half of the accidental oil pollUtion occu rring there. Being the most productive area of the ocean
in terms of total dollar value, the coastal zone would really be
hard hit . . ' here one of today's "popular sbe U 080,000 dwt) VLr:Cs
wers to duplicate the Torrey Canyon accident. The magnitude of
such a disaster would be difficult to convrehend and almost impossible to project where the vessel concerned might be a VLCC
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day (a bright red flag) and by night to diaplay a flashing red

light, flRshing 120 times per minute, in addition to regular
running lightD.
Ships must file a movement plan by noon preceeding their
day of transit in any of the prescribed traffic lanes by notify-

ing the appropriate NSA Of'f'Lce and provide: (1) .the name and gross
tonnage of the ship (2) length and draught ()
sien and methods of communication to be used

international call

(4) destination and

(5) estimated times of transit. In addition, ships carrying dangerous cargo Must report the type of cargo aboard.
Ships intending to transit one of the prescribed channels
_ must comply with four basic instructions: (1) establish and maintain contact with the appropriate MSA Office at least three hours
prior to arrival (2) change their time of arrival if so instnlcted
by the MSA Office (3) proceed at an assigned speed and

(4) make

no transit in poor Visibility.
Its too early to evaluate the Japanese scheme as to its effectiveness and there have been problems with VLCCs and crossing traffic. It is noted that other such schemes" such as that. in effect
in the Dover S~raits has tended to reduce· collision incidence and
inprove traffic flow.
Collisi.ons Versus Other Hazar-ds,

Over the years since l.rorld

War II, the total number of seaeoing vessels has not increased
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of 500,000 dwt or more. The Torrey Canyon lost her entire cargo
of 36 million gallons of cnlde oil to the sea off Land's

~d

whereas if we were to project the 153 million gallons that a

nce

the size of

the English

t~e

Ch~1nel,

Globtik Tokyo rrill carry, dump tha t into
the result would probably be more enduring

and quite catastrophic.
Multiple Use Conflicts Facing the VLCC.

The accidents that

have been referred to in the preceeding are examples of the growing problem of Jnultiple-use conflicts in the coastal areas as
well as in the open ocean areas of the world. These examples
represent problems that specifically involve ocean transport and
which represent conflicts with the potential for creating damage
for third parties. It is not. my intention to enter a Lengthy discussion of use conflicts here, but indeed the VLeG introduces a
great many new conflicts as well as the more ccmnon , Competition
with others for use of the oceans for the same purpose and competition with others for use of the same ocean space but for
different purposes such as deep water oil exploration and exploitation, fishing and recreation are only a few conflict areas. The
traditional concept of freedom of the seas

~

for a vessel to sail

or steam, wherever and whenever it chooses - seems to be Gaining
obsolescence and in need of reassessment.
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vessels the plan becomes only partially successful. This is
not to imply that mandatory traffic schemes are the ultimate
solution to the problem of collision, but they do represent a
giant step in the riGht di.rection towards solving multiple use
conflicts. If for exmnple, the imposition of mandatory traffic

I
I

separation and sea lane routd.ngs were to reduce the incidence
of major collisions by perhaps

50

per cent, which is a realistic

albeit conservative goal, the savings to the shipping industry
and third parties would be astronomical. Sea Lane advisories to
avoid shoals, deep water drilling rigs, storms, etc, such as the
U. S. Navy's Optimum Track Routing System is suggested. Also, it
. might be useful to incorporate route plans, such as the Navy's
Movement Report System under some form of international control
which could neLate a route that was considered too hazardous.

In concluaion, it is extremely important that nations be
provided some form of protp.ction in the control of shipping within their coastal zones.

Th~

Traffic Separation Scheme proposed

in the 1972 Rules revisi.on provides a vehicle by which this control can be exercised but only if such a
The question arises then,

nO

coas~~l

R~le

is made

states have this

mandatol~.
rig~t?

It

may become an irrelovant question overtaken by events should the
upcoming Law of the

Sea

r,onference adopt a change to tho 3 mile

territorial waters limit) jncreasing the limit to 12 miles or
more. Only time will tell.
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SllNMA RIZATION
PART III
."

After proceeding at some length to describe the nature of

the VLCC and attempt to impress upon the reader the emmense proportions and inherent limitations of these monsters of the sea 1

I can only hope t hat an appreciation has been gained with which
one can realize the potential hazards involved without closer
regulation. As I started research for this paper, I had in the
back of my mind thought of just how does one stop a 500,000 dwt

tanker plodding alone at

15

knots if an emorgency situation arose.

The answer is quite obviou3, you can't. The 1972 Rules revision
by IMCO takes this situation into

cons~deration

only by contin-

uing use of the old Rule concerning safe speed, however the
vagueness of what speed is a safe speed for a VLCC still prevails. It would appear that decision will have to be deferred
to await an admiralty court. decision to set a precept.
By far the most useful and most sienificant change to the

Rules of the Road is the introduction of Rule 10 concerning
;.

Traffic Separation Schemes and IMCO's influence over high density traffic areas such as the Straits of Dover, Gibraltar, the
Dardanelles/Bosporous and

~l

half-dozen othe rs which are 1 or should

be, under IHCOEJ appro val author-i. ty. Once established, and approved
by

rHeO,

it is my beliElf that the traffic separation scheme should

become a mandatory scheme, for without mandatory compliance by all
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APPEllOIX I
COHPARATIVE GROWTH rn DFADHTUGHT CAPACI'i'Y OF TANKER SHIPS
1950
26,500 tons

1954

45,750 tons

r '--

-

196/1
100,000 Ions

1959
68,840 tons

. . . .... ""...........

825 ft l,n9th

'. . . .1.

".l:::c:&:1:lU"

900 It lenllth

r

~ 967

. 210,000 tons

...-

I

:,

196B
312,000 ton.

I,'. ...
.....,..,...:::or.:
..........=.......
: 1130 It lenllih

i

I

I
1'--

--..-__

1913

483,644 tons

1135 " length

'.

1243 it length

Note: Tho ;Ircac of the) GfJuaroa ,11'0 p ropo r-Ld onn L to dondH'Li.{;l\t
tonnago , Lrmet.h: : a 1'0 iJldica. ted by th., da ric hori7..onl-al Liuca ,
Capacity Lnc rea.vec as t.he cube of the length, honco , increases

in vesssl length are less spectacular than deadweight tonnage.
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DESIGN DBTAIL OF THE MOBIL PEGASUS
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APPENDIX IV
TRAFFIC CONTROL SCHEME FOR DOVER STilAITS
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APPENDIX V

APPENDIX V
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Cargo Tonnage
Classified as either "waight ll or "measurement.", A llweighV' ton
of cargo is 2,240 pounds, and a II mea surernent " ton of cargo is
40 cubic feet. Freicht rates on eeneral careo are usually quoted
in dollars per ton, weight or measurement, at the ship's option.
This means that the specified rate par ton \ull be applied either
to a weight ton or to a meaeur'emerrt ton, whichever will result in
the hieher revenue, depending upon whether a weight ton of the
cargo occupies more or less than 40 cubic feet.
Deadweight Tonnage
The term IlTotal (vessel) D~adweight" is used to express the total
weight carrying capacity of a ship including cargo, fuel oil, crew,
fresh water, stores, etc. "Cargo Deadweight" is used to express the
cargo carrying capacity of the ship.
Displacement, Light
The weight, in tons of 2,240 pounds, Qf a vessel excluding cargo,
passengers, fuel, water, stores, dunnage, and other items necessary for use on a voyage.
Displacement, Loaded
The weight,
passengers,
ary for use
permissible

in tons of 2,240 pounds, of a vessel inclUding cargo,
fuel, water, stores, dunnage , and other items necesson a voyage which brings a vessel down to her maximum
draft.

Dunnage
~~ood

boards of various sizes used to shore up cargo in transit.

Essential Trade Route (Area)
A route between .ports in a U. S. coastal area or areas and a
specific fora:i.en coastal ar-ea or aroas wh1.c11 has been det.ermined
by the Haritime Adrninistl'i1tion to be essential for the promotion
deve l.opmen t , expansion, and maintenance of t.he foreign conunerce
of the U. S.
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Gross Tormage
The entire Lrrterna.l, cubic capacity of a ship expressed in tons
of 100 cubic feet to the ton, except for certain spaces ouch as
inner bottom peak tanks, peak and other tanks for water hallnst
open forecastle bridge an~ poop, shelter deck spaces, excess of
hatcmfays, certain light and air spaces, domes and skyli~ts,
l~leelhousc, galley, cabins for passengers, and certain other
spaces.
Liquid Cargo
Bulk - Commodities in liquid form transported in tankers or in
deep tanks of dry cargo ships.
Ships, Types of
Bulk Carriers - Ships carrying dr,y bulk cargoes such as wheat or
coal - as distinguished from tankers, another form of bulk carrier.
Tanker Ship - A. ship designed to carr,y liquid cargoes in bulk quantities, e5pecialJ~ petroleum.
Trade Route (Aroa)
A trade route (aroa) is a specifically desienated channel through
which the commerce of the U. S. flows between a particular U. S.
coastal area or areas and a specific foreien coastal area or areas.
Ullage
The usual way of measuring the amount of oil in the cargo tanks of
oil tankers is to measure the cUstance from the top of the hatch,
or from the top of· the Lnopectd.on cover in the hatch, down to the
surface of: the oil. This distance is called ullage and the corresponding capacity tables are known as ullage tables.
Weights and Conversion Factors
Quantity
Ft 3 per ton (2240 Ib)'
Gallons per ton ~
Barrels per ton *
Pounds per gallon
Pounds per cubic foot
Pounds per barrel

@

1 Ft3

<=

-l~

1 Bb1

c

7.h8 gallons

42 gal. or 5.61 Ft 3

Hater
Oil
----------------Salt Fresh
Fue L "DieGO).
Ga;,oline

35

SO

36
269.28

JA
41.5
284.2h J10.h2

3'14.00

7.391
7.216

fl. 905

62.222

6.768
7.881
58.947
331

53.976

44.800
251.5
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303

5.989

in 19,7, and almost all the oil is imported with about 50 per cent
2

of it coming front the }fdddle East.

The United States too has

placed increasing demands on imports and since 1968 has consumed
more petroleum than she has produced. Much of the imported oil
comes from the liaddle East. Thus with the Middle Eaaf a focal

point of oil production, and its customers located at the far
corners of the world, the requirement for transporting oil over
long distances becomes very obVious. owing to its physical

charac~

teriatics (lighter than water) and the universal thirst for oil,
there is great advantage in being able to transport it in great
bulk by sea. The tanker ship has , and is providing this advantage.

Tanker Developments.

It is primarily the emmense and ever-

increasing demand for oil that has influenced the size of tankers,
however world events such as the Suez Crisis of 1956, the emergence
of Japan as an industrial giant and the founding of the EEC in 19$7
have had their profound influences aa well. The threat of a closed
Suez erea ted a sharp increase in the demand fo r tanker capa ci ty by
the Europeans and in the U. S. This demand proved a very timely
circumstance for the Japanese shipbuilding industr,y, for they already had plans to build for themselves extraordinarily large oil

carriers. The shipyards of Japan provided -an exception to the upward apiraline costs of l abor and materials in shipbuilding and

even more importantly had both the capacity and the technical

2

eering plant is less complicated than the steam turbine plants
typical of the VLCC.
The advantages of computerized ship control systems per.mit
greater safety in operation in propulsion and guidance. It can
result in improved fuel consumption rates and a reduction in the
total number of personnel needed to operate the ship. Thera are
disadvantages too, primarily the reliability of the computer system itself and its maintainability. Some minor problems with electronic interference hAve also been noted.

A typical dir,ital computerized shipboard control system may
consist of a small computer, more probably two, costing as little
as $10,000 each. The main computer.components feed operator consoles for main propulsion, aUXiliary' machinery and perhaps one
for cargo control. Display panels may be either digital or CRT
types. A main propulsion console would be

l~cated

on the bridge

and under normal steaming conditions control would be exercised
by the deck watch officer and the entire engineering system mon-

itored by a single engineer on watch. The computer does the rest,
monitors all temperature guagea and pressure guages , all liquid
level indicators and

auto~~tically

regulates numerous boiler and

auxiliar,y machinery functions, inclUding printouts of bell anrt
engine/boiler pe rf'o rmance logs - traditionally done by Wiltch personnel to en3ure evel7 enginoering plant function was regularly
checked. Such an automated system also includes a safety feature

19

Inertial navigation systems, Loran A and Loran C, Depth recorder navieation, and

co~)uterized

DR systems are only a few

devices available to rendor the sextant obsolete. Many of the
VLCCs incorporate all of these systems, or at least a combination
of three or four that compliment one another to ensure exact position fixing so essential for efficient operations and the avoidance of disasters such as Torrey Canyon. Current efforts are to

marry the collision avoidance system computers to accomodate the
navigation systems thereby consolidating computers and reducing

18
costs.
VLCG Propulsion Systems. Of VLCCs above 200,000 dwt built
during 1970, 68 were steam turbine and only two were slow speed
die sel powered, and during 1971, these figures l-mre 63 and S respectively. Imring 1972, 69 VLCCs delivered had steam turbine 5ySsp~ed

diesel, and during 1973, steam turbines
19
outnumbered diesels by 72 to 10.
As can been seen from these figterns and 10 were slow

ures, the steam-turbine systems

predo~inate

the VLCG fleet. In an

article appearing in a recent issue of Shipping l'Jorld and Shipbuildor,
20

Ohashi and Romoto

drew some comparisons between the two systems in

discussing the future of gas turbine engines. It was their opinion
that steam turbines will maintain their predominance in the VLCC
market for the time being but that medium speed diesels would replac~

slow speed diesels and gas turbines gradually enter and

21

distance creates a unique set of circumstances with respect to
regulations set forth in the International Rules of the Road.
Clearly the VLCCs are
in terms of their

"out~ide

the law" so to speak - at least

man~lver~bility and

size.

Part II of this paper will discuss the current MIles and
their relationship to the VLCC and what is being done, or should
be done to remedy the problem.
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VLCCs AND RULES OF THE ROAD

PARI' II
Introduction.

In Part I it was intended to create a basic

understanding of the intracacies of the VLCC in terms of cost,
their many

advanta~es

as well as their limitations, for it is

these limitations that are 'so important in discussion of rules
governing ships at sea. I hope it is obvious from the foregoing
discussion that

VLr~s

have a tremendous pollution potential in

event of a major accident Buch as collision or grounding. I hope
it is also evident from the forer,oing that

ahipo~mers

and oper-

ators are acutely aware of the considerable investment they have
in each VLCC and consequently have gone to extensive efforts to
-protect this investment by hiring the

~est

possible crews, by

installing complex co'Ll.Lai.on prevention systems and devices to
protect their ship and cargo and hence to help control pollution.
Still, the beast is vulnerable by its size and limited maneuverability. Not only are they vulnerable unto themselves but to
others of their class and particularly to smaller, f'aster ships
and vice versa. It brings to my mind the destroyer - aircraft
carrier relationship and

~~

own somewhat facetious rule of thumb

that if you are on a destroyer at sea and can visually sir,ht an
aircraft ca rr-I er, you are too close. But then I'm comewna t hianed
about that, I've been involved in two destroyer-aircraft carrier
collisions. Be this as it may, it does not solve the problems
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confronting VI,eGa on the high seas and preventing collisions,
rules alone cannot do this. To this end however, there are Rules
to prevent collisions at sea that have existed for many years.
The presently effective Rules (1960) have recently been revised
because of the spectacular increase in the size and more limited
maneuverability of ships.
Accomodating the VLCC in New Rules of the Road.

Late in

1972 delegates from 46 nations met at the Inter-Goverrunental
rmritime Consultive Organization (]}IDO) building in London to
revise the 1960 International Rules of the Road for the Prevention of Collisions. One of tna most significant changes that
was adopted was that which provides definition to the VLCC and
accords such vessels with specific "privilege ll •
The

matt~r

of priVileGe is new with regard to the existing

Rules, althouzh it has beon implied. For example, ships not under
command

(breakdo~nl)

and ships engaged in special operations that

restrict their manellverability such as replenishment a.nd refueling
at sea and the launching and recovery of aircraft, have been entitled to show distinctive signals. Although the signal displays
have not carried with them a specific obliga tion .for anothe r ship
(which might have the richt of way) to remain clear, admiralty

courts have traditionally respect-ed such signals to irrIply privilege and a responsihility for the other vessel to give way.
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A brief explanation is in order here, under the Rules, the privileged vessel is that which in a crossing situation, holds the

other vessel off its port nide. It is the responsibility of the
other vessel ( the burdenen vessel) to give way to the privileged
vessel and the responsibility of the privileged vessel to maintain
her course and speed. In effect the

D~CO

revision gives priVilege

to the VLCC (and other vesRels under certain circumstances) due
to limited maneuverability. The revised Rule governing responsib11ities between vessels states:
IIAny vessel other than a vessel not unde r command
or a vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver
shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid
impeding the safe passage of a vessel constrained by
her draug~t, exhibiting the signals of Rule 28~

In clarification, Rule 28 calls for display of three verti-

cally arranged, all-around red lights

(by night) where they can

be best seen and by day, a black cylinder of not less than two
feet in diame tel' and a length of not less than J. 5 feet 'olhere

it can be best seen.
Also included in the revised Rules is a somewhat ambiguous
definition intended to apply to VLGGs. The Rule adopted s'tates:
"Rule 3 (h)

The torm , "ve s se I constrained by her draught,"

means

a power' driven ve suel Hhich because of her dr-aught,

in relation to the available depth of the water is
severely restricted in her ability to deviate from
the course she is following."

28

\

Unfortunately the \'Tording "vessel constrained by her draught,"
could be applied to a vessel with a five foot draught having di£ficul t~r steering in six fee t of water. Such a vessel could show
three vertical red Li.ght.s and expect privilege where not other
vessel would impede her passage.
Another aspect of this new Rule which questions its Hording
is that no shippin8 company or prudent ship's master loIil1 allow
his ship to be loaded to the point where they are unable to steer
her. The ship may need tugs to assist her in shallo'i'l harbors and
approaches Hhcn using slow speeds, but it is very unlikely that
the VLCes will be incapable of maneuvering on the hiGh seas because of their draught in relation -to the depth of the water.
The more significan problem of the VLCC is slowing, or stopping,
and not so much steering as pointed out in Part 1.
The reasoning behind the wording and the degree of privilege
accorded to the VLCC under the new Rules is made clearer by reviewing Rule 25

(~rarro'W

Channel Rule) from the currently effoctive Rules.

This Rule (25(0) states:
UIn a na r row channel a powerdriven vessel of less than
65 feet in length shall not hamper the safe paasagc of
a vessel which can navieate only inside the channel. 1I
This Rulos means that a vessel over

65

feet in length, ie.,

a 70 foot fishinB vessel, can require a VLCC to give way in a
crossing situation, according to the letter of the law, if the
fishing vessel is the privileged vessel. Placing this situation
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in perspective such as the narrows of the Straits of Malacca and
,"

Singapore where the naviBable channel is no more than

1.5 miles

in width, such a Rule represents a serious problem for the VLCC

if such vessels are not accorded special priVilege.
One can assume that the Rule governing responsibilities
between ships is straightforward enough to

pre~lude

such as that mentioned above, however the terms

II

problems

cons t r ai ned by

her draught II and "avaLl.ab'Ie depth of water" are subject to open
interpretation. Hopefully the admiralty courts will not conclude
that this is a matter of steering ability but will interpret the

wording to mean that a very large vessel in a narrow channel or
in an approved shipping lane, in congested waters, is not obliged
to alter course and that other vessels should give way. Only the
practice of mariners and eventual rulings of the admiralty courts
will determine whether or not the new Rules will accomplish their
purpose.
Rules Concerning Additional Lights for VLCCs.
of the

IMea

~lles

Another area

revision concerns Rules which prescribe lights

for vessels underway and at anchor (excluding the special lights
mentioned above). Rule 2 prescribes that when underway, a light

shall be carried in the fore part of the vessel and a seconrl
light (both white lir,hts) "hall be carried abaft the forward
light. The after lip,ht shall be carried at least
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15

feet hiEher

